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BLD-373    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
No. 12-3538 
___________ 
 
DAWN MARIE BALL, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LT. HUMMEL; SUPT. GIROUX; TROY EDWARDS; MAJOR FRANZ; 
CAPT. KERSHNER; CAPT. WALTMAN; CAPT. CURHAM; DEPUTY SMITH; 
DEPUTY NICOLAS; C/O KURTZ; C/O ECKROTH; C/O HOWE; NURSE BOYER; 
JANE DOES 3 FEMALE C/O'S; JOHN DOES 3 MALE C/O'S 
 ____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00814) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 5, 2014 
 
 Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  September 17, 2014) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Dawn Ball appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, which revoked her in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status.  
Ball seeks leave to proceed IFP on appeal.  We will grant the motion to proceed IFP,
1
 but 
we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion to revoke Ball’s IFP status, 
finding that she had the following three “strikes” at the time she filed her complaint (in 
May 2012):  Ball v. Butts, No. 1:11-cv-1068 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 2011) (dismissed 
because defendant was entitled to absolute immunity), Ball v. Hartman, No. 1:09-cv-844 
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010) (dismissed for failure to state a claim), and Ball v. Butts,  445 F. 
App’x 457, 475 (3d Cir. Sept. 21, 2011) (not precedential) (dismissed as frivolous).  The 
District Court did not have the benefit of our opinion in Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448 
                                                 
1
 Ball qualifies financially to proceed IFP, but because she has accumulated “three strikes” for 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), see Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 2013), she 
may not proceed IFP unless she can show “imminent danger of serious physical injury” when 
she filed this appeal.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (en banc).  To fulfill the “imminent danger” requirements, she must demonstrate an 
adequate nexus between the claims [s]he seeks to pursue and the imminent danger [s]he alleges.”  
See Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009).  Here, Ball’s complaint alleged 
excessive force used during cell extraction on January 10, 2012, despite her alleged failure to 
resist or disobey orders.  She alleged that the extraction involved use of an electric body 
immobilizer device (EBID), causing burns and continuing headaches, nausea and blurred vision, 
and sexual assault by female guards in front of male guards.  The imminent danger motion on 
appeal similarly describes being beaten and sexually assaulted by guards, with threats to harm 
her further the next time.  See Imminent Danger Motion (stating that guards “are threatening my 
life & my family’s lives & tell me they will beat me up again, but worse this time.”); Chavis v. 
Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (“An allegation of a recent brutal beating, combined 
with three separate threatening incidents, some of which involved officers who purportedly 
participated in that beating, is clearly the sort of ongoing pattern of acts that satisfies the 
imminent danger exception.”).  We find that these allegations concern serious physical injury, 
and that (in contrast to her allegations in a number of her recent appeals) she has shown a 
sufficient nexus between the allegations of the complaint and the allegations of imminent danger.  
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(3d Cir. 2013), in which we determined that a dismissal because a defendant is immune 
from suit does not constitute a “strike.”  See id., 726 F.3d at 466 (“The District Court’s 
dismissal of [Ball v.] Butts [No. 11-cv-1068] does not count as a strike because it was 
based on immunity.”).  However, at the time Ball filed the complaint in this case, she had 
incurred a third strike; namely, the dismissal of Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 08-cv-0391 
(M.D. Pa.), on a motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because Ball had failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies.  See Ball, 726 F.3d at 466.  Ball thus had three strikes 
at the time she filed the complaint here.   
 The Report and Recommendation, adopted by the District Court, also evaluated 
whether Ball was under “imminent danger” at the time she filed her complaint.  The 
Court noted that four months had elapsed between the cell extraction during which she 
alleged that she was physically harmed and the filing of the complaint.  Further, the 
District Court noted that Ball’s complaint did not contain any allegations that she was 
under imminent danger of serious physical injury, as opposed to having suffered past 
injury.  Ball did not object to the Report and Recommendation, nor did she supplement 
her IFP application to attempt to meet the requirements of § 1915(g), as she was invited 
to do by the District Court.  Instead, she simply appealed the District Court’s order.   
 We agree that Ball did not demonstrate that she was in imminent danger of serious 
physical injury at the time she filed the complaint.  It may seem odd that we have granted 
Ball’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal and yet affirm the District Court’s revocation of 
her IFP status.  But because Ball, at the time of her appeal, alleged renewed threats from 
the guards that were the subject of the allegations of her complaint, we find that she 
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satisfied the requirements of § 1915(g) here.  The complaint, in contrast, lacked any such 
allegations of renewed threats. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.       
 
